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The Northwest Power Planning Council 




The Northwest Power Planning Council (Council) is an
interstate compact body consisting of two members appointed by
each of the Governors of Montana, Idaho, Oregon, and Washington.
The Council was created pursuant to the Northwest Power Act of
19B0 (Act) and was mandated by that Act to develop the Northwest
Conservation and Electric Power Plan and the Columbia Basin Fish
and Wildlife Program.
The Council has been successful in furthering cooperative
electric power and fish and wildlife mitigation planning among
the states, federal agencies, Indian tribes, utilities, and
environmental groups that make up the Pacific Northwest electric
utility and fish and wildlife communities. Three factors have
been crucial to this success: first, a tradition of cooperation
within the region which resulted from the development of the
Columbia Basin hydroelectric system; second, a perception widely
shared within the region at the time of the Act's passage that a
future without continued cooperation and a new regional body to
institutionalize it would be unacceptable; and third, key
features of the pouncil provided in the Act. These Council
features included: stable funding; a clear policy mandate; clear
jurisdictional proscriptions; operating standards and procedures;
accountability to the region through the state governments; and
the necessity to persuade because of an inability to compel.
The Council has been suggested as a model for cooperative
management of water resources in the Missouri Basin. The
Missouri does face circumstances somewhat similar to those of the
Columbia when the Act was passed and Council was created: past
and potential conflicts over management of the river; a similar
mix of interested parties, including states, federal agencies,
Indian tribes, fish and wildlife managers, utilities, irrigators,
and environmental and public interest groups; and a hydroelectric
system apparently available as a funding source. However, a
number of factors render application of the Council model, i.e.,
an interstate compact planning body charged with comprehensive,
basin-wide planning, to the Missouri both premature and
difficult: the absence of a unifying perception of the future
that cooperation within the basin is imperative; the lack of a
shared understanding of the interests of and trust among the
basin's states, federal agencies, and Indian tribes; the size and
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complexity of the basin; and constraints on the practicality of
the Missouri hydro revenues as a funding source.
A less ambitious pre-Council model may be appropriate.
Rather than an interstate compact planning body, a less formal
group might be formed by agreement of the basin's states, federal
agencies, and tribes for the purposes of: compiling hydrologic
and water use data; identifying data needs; proposing data
standardization guidelines; and compiling and discussing
outstanding equity concerns arising both from past river
management decisions such as the content and implementation of
the Pick-Sloan program.	 From this approach a more formal and
comprehensive Council-type model might evolve.
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II. Northwest Power Planning Council
A. Organization
The Northwest Power Planning Council is an interstate
compact body authorized by the Northwest Power Act (Public Law
96-501) consisting of two members from each of the States of
Montana, Idaho, Oregon, and Washington. The members are
appointed by the Governors and confirmed by the Legislatures of
their respective states.
B. Mandate
The Act directs the Council to develop the Northwest
Conservation and Electric Power Plan (Plan) and the Columbia
Basin Fish and Wildlife Program (Program). The Plan must include
a twenty year forecast of electrical demand and a resource plan
to meet that demand at the lowest total cost. The Program must
provide for the mitigation of the damage to fish and wildlife
caused by past development and operation of hydroelectric dams on
the Columbia River and its tributaries and for protection against
damage by future hydroelectric development and operation.
Both the Plan and the Program must guide the activities
of an agency of the United States Department of Energy, the
Bonneville Power Administration (BPA). The BPA may not acquire
the output of new electrical resources including conservation
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with a capacity of 50 megawatts or larger without formally
determining that such a purchase would be consistent with the
Plan. The Council may review BPA's determination and should
either the Council or SPA make a negative finding, SPA may not
make the purchase without Congressional authorization. The SPA
Administrator must also use his funds and his legal authorities
to "...protect, mitigate, and enhance..." fish and wildlife to
the extent affected by the development and operation of any
hydroelectric project of the Columbia River and its tributaries
in a manner consistent with the Plan and Program.
C. The Council Has Furthered Cooperation Within the Region
The Council's most notable achievement has been the
development of the Plan and Program through a public, cooperative
process. Examples of cooperative activities stimulated by the
Plan and Program include: states are working with EPA, utilities,
and conservation groups to chart and pursue a course of least-
cost electricity resource development; state agencies and Indian
tribes are conducting fish production and harvest planning in
concert rather than through litigation; state and federal fish
agencies, the tribes, SPA, and the utilities have negotiated
agreements to provide fish protection in the operation of
mainstem dams on the Columbia and Snake Rivers and are jointly
lobbying the Congress for additional fish passage protection at
these dams; environmental groups are negotiating electricity rate
case agreements with utilities; and utilities are supporting the
efforts of state and local governments to improve the energy
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efficiency of new buildings.
III. Three Factors Critical to the Council's Success
A. Tradition of cooperation.
Since the early 1900's, the generation of electricity has
been a dominate use of the waters of the rivers of the Columbia
Basin.	 Over a sixty year period, public and private electric
utilities and	 the federal	 government built the	 largest
coordinated hydroelectric system in the world. Today in an
average year, the Columbia Basin dams generate over 140 billion
kilowatt-hours, about 14 times the total generation of the
Missouri. As the system grew, the utility community recognized
the tremendous advantage in operating the dams on a single-owner
basis.	 Simply put, the total generation from all the dams
operated as one system is far greater than the total produced by
all the dams operated independently. In 1964, this single-owner
approach was codified contractually within the U.S. portion of
the Columbia Basin and extended basin wide through a treaty with
Capada. This tradition of cooperation within the utility
community stemming directly from the river itself provided the
kernel from which a larger cooperative effort could and did grow.
B. Shared perception of the need for a new regional
cooperative approach and planning entity.
During the late 1970's, a perception began to develop and
spread throughout the region that challenges facing the electric
utility industry and the Columbia Basin fishery could not be met
without	 federal	 legislation	 creating new mechanisms	 for
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cooperation. The once seemingly limitless supply of cheap
hydroelectricity had reached the end of its expansion. Utilities
therefore faced a dual problem: how to allocate a finite supply
of cheap hydroelectricity among all parties, and how to expand
the supply with new electricity resources to meet what appeared
to be rapidly growing consumer demands. Because of their expense
and difficulty in winning regulatory approvals from the states,
the new resources, coal and nuclear plants, were becoming too
risky for individual utilities. Some new means of financing and
licensing these plants seemed vital to the utilities. Also, the
private utilities who had pioneered the development of thermal
generating plants watched their rates skyrocket relative to
public utilities served by the cheap federal hydroelectric power.
Allocation wars over who would continue to receive the cheaper
power loomed large on the horizon.
Meanwhile, conflict was heating up on another related
front. The cheap hydroelectricity which had fueled the region's
economic growth had come at significant cost to another resourae
which was also integral to the heritage of the Columbia River,
the runs of salmon and steelhead. Prior to the development of
the basin, the annual run of adult salmon and steelhead totaled
on the order of 13 million fish.	 By the early 1970's, this run
had dwindled to only 2.5 million, an 80% loss. In response to
this loss and the harvest conflicts it engendered, the Indian
tribes whose culture and economy centered on the salmon had won a
series of lawsuits that threatened to turn control of the river
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over to a federal judge on behalf of Indian treaty rights. Also,
the federal fishery managers faced with the imminent extinction
of salmon and steelhead runs were considering adding those runs
to the endangered species list, an action which could have again•
crippled the existing management of the river.
There seemed no way out but federal legislation which
would balance the interests of all parties, the states, the feds,
the utilities, the tribes and other fishery managers, and the
conservation and other public interest groups. And so these
parties proceeded with fits and starts to fashion a classic
compromise which met the vital interests of all parties. That
compromise became federal law when President Carter signed the
Northwest Power Act in December of 1980.
C. Key Council Characteristics
The framers of the Act institutionalized the tradition of
regional cooperation in a new entity, the Northwest Power
Planning Council, and provided the Council with features critical
to its success:
1. Stable funding which is provided via a surcharge on
power sold by SPA. A surcharge of less than 0.3% on SPA rates
allows the Council a budget of about $7 million per year. This
stable funding has enabled the Council to maintain the quality
staff and other resources to be a credible force in the power and
fish and wildlife communities.
2. A clear policy mandate which has kept the Council
working towards definite goals and objectives and given it
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considerable persuasive power in dealing with all of the
individual interests in the basin.
3. Clear proscriptions carefully excluding certain areas
from the Council's jurisdiction. These were necessary to protect
the existing sovereignty of key parties to the Act so that they
could accept the Council's creation. The proscriptions included
unambiguous direction that the Council may not in any way affect
existing contractual rights and obligations of the EPA or its
customers, Indian treaty rights, state water rights, state energy
facility siting regulation, state retail electricity rate
setting, or existing federal licenses issued pursuant to other
federal law.
4. Operating procedures and standards including equal
representation on the Council of the four Pacific Northwest
states and the application to the Council of two federal laws,
the Freedom of Information Act and the Government in the Sunshine
Act.	 Equal representation of the states was a prerequisite to
the consensus necessary for the Council's creation and for its
successful operation. 	 Application of the two federal laws
ensured that the business of ' the Council, including its
decisions, has been open and accessible to the public.
Conducting business in this manner has strengthened the Council
by allowing the public to understand and affect, and therefore to
accept Council decisions.
5. Accountability	 to	 the	 region	 through	 state
governments.	 Because the Council is a creature of the states,
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its members are appointed by governors and confirmed by
legislatures, it can be held accountable by the people it serves.
This accountability through the political system is crucial to
keeping the Council grounded in the values, needs, and
aspirations of the people of Montana, Idaho, Oregon, and
Washington. Without this grounding a regional body will tend to
become one more layer of government at least as independent and
disconnected from the states as the federal government. With
this grounding via the governors the Council has pursued the
national and regional interests set forth in its charter while
maintaining close connection with state interests.
6. And, finally, an imperative to persuade rather than 
compel. As a planning body, the Council does not have its hands
on the controls that operate the dams or deliver electricity or
raise and harvest the salmon and steelhead. The Council has some
authority to veto actions; it has almost no legal authority to
compel action. Because it lacks the legal power to compel, the
Council must persuade. Ultimately, what has and will continue to
determine whether or not the Plan and Program are implemented is
the validity and strength of the ideas they contain. When the
ideas have been sound and acceptable to the people of the region,
then those entities which really do operate the controls in the
power and fish and wildlife communities for the most part have
been persuaded. Empowering the Council to persuade rather than
compel was a critical decision for its effectiveness because it
allowed agreement to the Council's creation, and it has kept the
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Council efforts from becoming bogged down in court challenges.
IV. Presently, the Council is Not a Practical Model for the
Missouri Basin
Because of its success in planning for and facilitating
cooperative management of hydropower and fish and wildlife
resources in the Columbia Basin, the Council has been suggested
as a model for cooperative management in other basins including
the Missouri. While the reality of river management in the
Missouri Basin today has several basic similarities with that of
the Columbia Basin at the time of the passage of the Northwest
Power Act, it also has significant differences which would render
application of the Council model to the Missouri premature and
difficult.
Both the Missouri and the Columbia are major rivers
managed for multiple purposes primarily by two federal agencies,
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation.
These purposes include: hydroelectric generation, navigation,
irrigation, fish and wildlife, flood control, water supply, and
recreation.	 These purposes are vital to the economies and
environments of the states in both basins. The management of
these purposes also engender conflicts within and among interests
in both basins including federal agencies, the states, Indian
tribes,	 fish	 and	 wildlife	 managers,	 electric	 utilities,
irrigators, recreationists, environmentalists, etc.
While the general nature of the management conflicts and
the interests are similar, the most significant conflicts in the
Columbia Basin in the late 1970's and the Missouri today are not.
In the Columbia, attention was primarily focussed on two
conflicting but non-consumptive uses of the Columbia waters:
hydroelectric generation and the salmon and steelhead fishery.
The effects of this conflict although not completely understood
were evident and generally accepted basin-wide the
hydroelectric system had substantially harmed the fishery. The
necessity for remedial action and the nature of the remedy were
also generally accepted basin-wide. The operation and any future
development of the hydroelectric system had to be changed to
accommodate restorat4on and protection of the fishery. However,
because inexpensive hydroelectric power is a fundamental
ingredient of the Pacific Northwest economy, these changes would
have to be made in a manner that did not significantly impair the
production of inexpensive electricity. In this environment,
agreement to create a new institution charged with cooperative
development of the restoration and protective program was
possible and did occur.
The conflict in the Missouri Basin, on the other hand, is
generally over future consumptive water uses with consequences
not widely understood or accepted. Virtually all management
purposes and interests might be affected. Upper basin states and
Indian tribes who were either left out or have not received
promised Pick-Sloan benefits seek water development or other
compensation; lower basin power consumer, navigation, flood
control, water supply, and fish and wildlife interests feel
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threatened. Consensus for action does not exist.
The Missouri Basin also differs from the Columbia in size
and hence numbers of interests which any planning body must
accommodate.	 The Council includes representatives of only four
states. A Missouri planning group would encompass ten states.
Because the issues in the Missouri stem from consumptive
allocation questions and because of the nature of Indian water
rights, any planning body may also need to include tribal
representation. Creating both a mechanism for representation and
operating procedures which balance the protection of individual
interests and sovereignty with the need of the planning body to
make decisions and take actions would therefore be much more
complex and difficult in a Missouri body. 	 Surmounting this
complexity and difficulty would 	 require more trust and
understanding within the basin than presently exists.
Finally, there is the issue of funding.	 The shear
magnitude of hydropower in the Columbia made this issue
tractable. Hydro revenues were and continue to be large enough
to incorporate funding the Council as well as implementation of
the largest fish and wildlife mitigation program in the world
without significantly affecting power rates. The same would not
be true in the Missouri.	 Annual federal hydropower revenues in
the Columbia today are about $2 billion. 	 In 1986, federal
hydropower revenues in the Missouri were just over $90 million.
Funding only a basin-wide planning body modeled on the Council
with no moneys for plan implementation would have a noticeable
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effect on power rates.	 Such an effect would likely engender
opposition from existing power users throughout the basin.
Federal hydropower revenues therefore cannot be relied upon as
the sole source of funding for a Council model in the Missouri.
V.	 Conclusion
While a Council model for cooperative basin-wide planning
has been successful for the Columbia Basin, conditions are not
ripe for applying it to the Missouri. Because the Missouri Basin
is larger and involves more parties as well as issues of
potential water consumption with uncertain consequences,
additional knowledge, understanding and trust building should
proceed an attempt to implement a Council model. A major funding
source or sources in addition to hydropower revenues will also
likely be required.
The additional knowledge, understanding, and trust necessary
for a basin-wide cooperative planning and/or management body
might be developed through an approach identified and discussed
at last year's Symposium on the Future of the Missouri River
organized by the Missouri River Management Project of the
Northern Lights Research and Education Institute. In what might
be considered a pre-Council model, a group would be formed and
funded by agreement of the basin states, federal agencies, and
tribes and charged with the limited purposes of: compiling
hydrologic and water use data, identifying data needs, proposing
data standardization guidelines, and compiling and discussing
outstanding equity concerns arising from past management
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decisions such as the content and implementation of the Pick-
Sloan program.
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